On April 1, 1864 the Confederate Currency Reform Act reduced the money supply in the Eastern Confederacy by one third. The delayed implementation of the reform west of the Mississippi provides a counterfactual view of what may have happened in the east had the reform not been enacted. This episode is a natural experiment illustrating the relative importance for prices of war news vs. the quantity of money in circulation. Our analysis of the major eastern and western gold markets, Richmond and Houston, strongly suggests that money matters more than war news in the post-reform period.
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Inflation Is Always and Everywhere a Monetary Phenomenon: Richmond vs. Houston in 1864
Milton Friedman's famous proposition tying inflation to excessive money growth seems to have been always and everywhere rejected in the latest studies of the Civil War era. Analysis of both the Northern paper "greenback" currency (Willard, Guinnane and Rosen, 1996; Smith and Smith, 1997 ) and the Southern "grayback" (McCandless, 1996) points to the same conclusion: currency fluctuations are not caused by changes in the quantity of money but rather by war news and, to a lesser extent, financial news. Such evidence supports Mitchell's (1903, p. 188) classic claim that "the fluctuations in the premium on gold were so much more rapid and violent than the changes in the volume of the circulating medium ..."
1 Such arguments do not apply to the 1864 Confederate experience, however. And we offer new proof that Friedman (1992, p. 202 ) is entirely correct in citing the 1864 Confederate Currency Reform Act as a dramatic textbook example of how a drastic change in the quantity of money led to an equally drastic change in the price level.
The Currency Reform Act of February 17, 1864 effectively repudiated approximately one-third of the existing Confederate money supply. 2 Lerner (1956, p. 172) 
assesses the impact of this Act in the Eastern
Confederacy:
[Once] the currency reform took hold ... the general price index dropped ... in spite of invading Union armies, the impending military defeat, the reduction in foreign trade, the disorganized government, and the low morale of the Confederate army. Reducing the stocks of money had a more significant effect on prices than these powerful forces.
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But the only way to be sure that the price decline was really due to the money supply reduction would be to compare price movements in a Confederate economy where the reform was enacted to price movements in a Confederate economy where no such reform took place. If Lerner (1956) is right then the latter economy should, of course, not experience the same deflation. On the other hand, if only war news mattered, both economies should exhibit similar inflation rates irrespective of whether or not the reform takes place. In 1864 there were indeed two separate Confederate economies. Following the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863, the loss of communications across the Mississippi isolated the western portion of the Confederacy from 2 Richmond so that this Trans-Mississippi region no longer had ready access to the money being printed in the east. And while the Currency Reform Act took effect on April 1, 1864 east of the Mississippi it was not implemented at that time west of the Mississippi. The implementation of the Act in the Trans-Mississippi was officially delayed until July 1, 1864 and, as a practical matter, was delayed even further by extreme difficulties in getting the new currency across the enemy-occupied Mississippi. Accordingly, this episode provides a unique natural experiment with which to test the relative importance for prices of war news vs. the quantity of money in circulation.
In this paper, we present fresh evidence on the effects of this reform using new data from primary newspaper sources on the gold price of Confederate currency in both Richmond (the major eastern gold market) and Houston (the major western gold market). The Currency Reform Act, as passed on February 17, 1864, required that most Confederate notes then outstanding be either converted into bonds or else exchanged for new currency on a 3 for 2 basis. We confirm Lerner's (1956) observation that the implementation of this Act in the east is accompanied by a marked appreciation of Confederate currency in the east. Substantial depreciation continued in the west, however, where the old currency continued to circulate. In early 1864, a
Confederate dollar was worth about 4-5 cents in gold whether one tried to exchange it in Richmond or in Houston. Between March and early June 1864, however, Confederate currency depreciated by approximately 100% in Houston while simultaneously appreciating in the east. The extent of this divergence can be seen in 
I. Money vs. War News
Classical quantity theory implies a simple one-for-one relationship between money and prices under the assumption that both the velocity of circulation and real output can be treated as constants. High inflation episodes are hardly likely to exhibit stable velocity, however. And, in war time, fluctuations in velocity can 3 arise from not only changing inflation expectations but also news and rumors concerning the military situation, likely duration of the conflict, and so forth. Furthermore, real output could hardly remain constant in the face of the diversion of resources to the military effort and losses incurred in battle and through
Northern incursions into Confederate territory. In that sense, the wanton devastation of Sherman's "March to the Sea," for example, would enter as a negative "supply shock." There is really no definitive way to separate the influences exerted by these disparate forces on the Confederate currency depreciation that prevails from 1861 through early 1864. 4 Military defeats, lost territory, higher actual and expected inflation, and monetary expansion surely all play some role and each of these factors points in the same direction. Evidence that statistically-determined "turning points" in the gold value of the grayback (Weidenmier, 2000) , like those in the Northern greenback (Willard, Guinnane and Rosen, 1996) , often coincide with major battles does, however, point to a major role played by war news over that period. November may have helped underpin the gold value of the grayback during the late spring and summer of 1864 (cf, Brown and Burdekin, 2000) . But any such effects surely were symmetric across the western and eastern portions of the Confederacy. As we find that currency values in Richmond and Houston continued to follow a parallel course from the summer of 1863 --when the Confederacy was first cut in two --until March 1864, it is hard to see why the effects of war news would suddenly become asymmetric more than six months after the separation occurred. For our purposes, war news basically drops out of the comparison between western and eastern currency values. So long as war news continued to have similar effects in both east and west, this leaves the effects of the money supply change as the sole asymmetric factor that can plausibly 4 account for the divergence between eastern and western currency values after March 1864 --a divergence that was non-existent until the Act took effect in the east.
While this divergence does not imply that there was no role played by war news it does prove that war news cannot be the whole story. And the evident importance of the drastic change in the quantity of money certainly contradicts the more extreme view that war news was all that mattered. Such a perspective is adopted, for example, by McCandless (1996) , who argues that Confederate currency values should depend only upon the expected date, and price, at which the Confederate currency was to become convertible into gold. This implies that, since the Confederate currency both east and west of the Mississippi was issued and redeemable by the same government, that there should not be persistent differences across the two regions and prices should converge together over time. This clearly is not the case after March 1864. 5 Another damaging observation is that, when regular quotes for the new currency do start to become available in the west at the beginning of 1865, these quotes remain substantially different from the quoted values for the same new currency in the east. Once again there is a quantity-theory based explanation for the divergence, however.
The strength of the new currency in the east was clearly on the wane by November 1864. By this time, Grant had placed Richmond in a state of siege and Sherman captured Atlanta before beginning his "march to the sea." But, even though unfavorable war news should seemingly also have depressed the value of the grayback in the west, the new issue remained strong there and depreciated only mildly in the Houston market until news of General Lee's surrender was received in mid-April 1865 (Pecquet, 1988, p. 291 ). This otherwise-inexplicable second divergence seems to reflect the much greater scarcity of the new currency in the west. While monetary expansion began to accelerate again in the east in late 1864 (Godfrey, 1978, p. 119) , Pecquet (1987, p. 234) points to an effective reduction in the Trans-Mississippi supply of Confederate currency from $160 million in February 1864 to as little as $17 million in January 1865. The new currency remained in short supply in the west until the end of the war even though it was being printed with abandon in 5 the east. Indeed, with Confederate currency being receivable for state taxes, its relative scarcity actually caused it to exchange at a premium to Louisiana treasury notes in the Trans-Mississippi until mid-April 1865 (Pecquet, 1988, pp. 292-93) .
II. Richmond vs. Houston
In contrast to the daily data that has long been available on Northern greenback prices, published data on the gold price of Confederate currency has been of seemingly much lower quality. In order to obtain a series with better than monthly frequency past researchers have had to resort either to using a newspaper column of unknown origin pasted into the back of a library book (McCandless, 1996) On Monday morning last, one thousand dollars in gold were sold at sixty two and a half in Confederate money for one in specie. Two hours afterward came the news of the fall of Fort Fisher. Immediately gold rose to seventy one, and for several days continued to advance, through the combined influence of the brokers, till it reached seventy six: but here it stopped, and has since had a steady downward tendency.
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The series on eastern gold prices that we derive from primary newspaper sources reveals many discrepancies in the aforementioned McCandless and New York Evening Post accounts. These latter series, inter alia, report constant prices for weeks or months even though contemporary newspapers show that there was active trading and significant fluctuations in price over the same interval. Another problem with these series is that it is unclear whether they are dealing with actual trading prices, bid prices, ask prices, or some combination of the three.
We combine our analysis of the eastern data with biweekly data on the gold price of Confederate implies that the implementation of the Act coincides with a substantial change in the relationship between the eastern and western currency markets.
Clearly the reduction of the money supply in the east mattered and the break in the depreciation following the reform is evident in Figure 1 . As reflected in the cointegration test results, a substantially different pattern emerges in the west where we gain some insights into what might have happened to
Confederate currency values in Richmond had the reform not been applied. The cointegration effects affirm the strong link between changes in the quantity of money and the value of the fiat currency. And, given that the properties of the currency series fundamentally change after the currency reform is effected, there is surely no reliable way of comparing the effects of war news before and after that date.
Comparison with the west provides strong evidence that the reform mattered and that the replacement of the old currency with the new currency fundamentally altered both the properties of the eastern series and shattered its hitherto parallel relationship with western currency values.
The course of depreciation of the old currency in the west in 1864 is itself quite uneven. The depreciation is, in fact, briefly reversed in June 1864 before further depreciation sets in after the beginning of July. Interestingly, the period of strength immediately precedes the announced July 1, 1864 date at which the reform was to take effect in the west. Figure 1 shows that in the east there was also a strengthening of the currency --albeit on a smaller scale --in the weeks prior to the April 1, 1864 date at which the reform was implemented in the east. In the east the gold value then strengthens further after the new currency replaces the old. In the west, however, the new currency could not replace the old on the promised July 1 date because of difficulties in transporting the new issue across the enemy-occupied Mississippi River. According to Pecquet (1987, p. 232) :
As the public became aware that the new issue would never be exchanged for the old notes, it meant that the old currency would have to be exchanged for less valuable bond certificates. This led to a gradual reduction in the gold value of old currency following the July 1 funding date ... Doubts about the prospects for this funding increased the longer that the TransMississippi Treasury failed to make the exchange and especially in September when General Sherman's Georgia campaign placed a second unfriendly army between the monetary source and the western Treasury depositories.
The Currency Reform Act laid down a phased repudiation for the old currency that would end with 100% repudiation by January 1, 1865. Prior to that date holders had the option of either exchanging the old notes for new currency on a 3:2 basis (3 old notes for 2 new notes) or else exchanging the old currency for bond certificates. The relative illiquidity of the bond certificates reduced their appeal meaning that, with no new currency available, the only alternative to accepting the bonds was to spend the old issue before it was fully repudiated. In the case of $100 bills, holders had a further incentive to spend the money quickly because of an additional 10% "tax" was to be applied each month after the July 1 funding date. 10 Failure to provide new currency on July 1, 1864 therefore likely added to the velocity of circulation of the old currency while also disappointing expectations that the currency exchange would reduce the stock of money in line with the experience in the east in April 1864. The failure to implement the reform as promised therefore seems to explain the very rapid depreciation in the west that sets in at the beginning of July 1864. Meanwhile, the promised July 1 funding date seems to be preceded by a trading pattern that mimics that observed in the east three months earlier.
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The rapid depreciation from July-September 1864 is then followed by a period where the old issue remains relatively steady at an exchange rate for gold of a little under 50:1 between October and December 1864. In September 1864 the Trans-Mississippi Treasury began issuing "certificates of exchange" that could be redeemed for new currency when adequate supplies became available. These certificates were apparently valued more highly than the bond certificates (unlike the bond certificates they were to remain tax receivable in 1865) and their issuance may have helped quell the depreciation of the old currency in October 1864 (Pecquet, 1987, p. 233) . By late 1864 quotes on new issue gold prices begin to appear in Houston and Figure   1 shows that the new issue is, as expected, valued considerably above the old issue. The near-absence of quotations for old currency after January 1, 1865 suggests that much --if not all --of the old currency had been exchanged by this date. This suggests a sizeable differential in the value of the same currency and this differential would likely have been wider still were it not for Trenholm's intervention in the gold market that artificially bolstered Richmond currency values in early 1865. One possible explanation for these divergent gold values in 1865 is a military one. Richmond was being increasingly threatened not only by General Grant but also by General Sherman who was advancing north through the Carolinas. Conceivably the Trans-Mississippi was in a position to hold out longer or even make a separate peace. It seems unlikely that these considerations could fully account for the remarkable strength of the new issue in the west, however. Pecquet (1987, pp. 238-239) calculates that, owing to the much reduced supply of new issue notes that reached the Trans-Mississippi, the per capita nominal money supply in January 1865 was about 2.68 times greater in the east than in the west. The 
IV. Conclusions
Contrary to the view espoused in much recent Civil War research, we believe that Friedman (1992) is right to refer to the 1864 Confederate experience as a textbook case of drastic money supply changes causing drastic price changes. But it is more than that: the Currency Reform Act is a unique natural 1. Calomiris (1988) also emphasizes the importance of fiscal news in driving the greenback price of gold during the entire 1862-1878 period of greenback suspension.
2.
Detailed accounts of this quite complex Act --and the motivations that led to its passage --are provided by Schwab (1901) , Todd (1954) , Pecquet (1987) and Ball (1991) .
3. This is a truncated version of the quote given by Friedman (1992, p. 202) .
4.
See Lerner (1956) and Burdekin and Langdana (1993) on the course of the currency depreciation in the eastern Confederacy.
5.
Although the funding date was different, Confederate currency both east and west of the Mississippi remained subject to identical redemption provisions. There is no sense in which currency held in the west was subordinate to the same currency issue held in the east. Indeed, the notes were identical in every way.
6.
In the east the switch from old to new currency occurs on April 1, 1864 and from that point on only new currency is quoted in eastern financial markets. Meanwhile, in the west regular quotations of the old currency continue through the end of 1864, after which new currency quotes predominate there. We restrict our empirical work to data through December 31, 1864 in order to focus on the comparison between old currency in the west and new currency in the east.
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7. Details are available from the authors upon request.
8.
Furthermore, the process appears to be symmetric in that we are unable to reject the restriction that there is a one-to-one linkage between the Richmond and Houston markets in the pre-reform period. The corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic (2.22 ~ ? 2 1 ) is not significant at even the ten percent level.
9.
While war news could have had uniform effects in both east and west, Milton Friedman has pointed out to us in private correspondence that "those effects were superimposed upon the effects of very different movements in the quantity of money." At the very least, common war news cannot alone explain Confederate currency movements in the postreform period.
10. This additional 10% tax applied only to the $100 bills but these were a significant portion of the money supply by 1864. Meanwhile, all notes of $5 and higher remained subject to 100% repudiation by January 1, 1865.
11.
Although most old issue notes were scheduled to be fully repudiated on January 1, 1865, the Confederate Congress actually moved in late December 1864 to cancel this repudiation of the old currency (see Ball, 1991, p. 188) . News of this decision could scarcely have reached the Trans-Mississippi before the end of the year, however. 
